Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation

 We develop a reputation model to study the concurrent use of trademarks and certification for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). The model extends Shapiro’s (1983) approach to modeling reputation to a situation in which two technologies for the production of quality are available, one of which is available only in the GI region and has a cost advantage for the production of higher quality levels. In this setting, trademarks capture firm-specific reputations whereas GI certification captures a notion of collective reputation. The model shows that GI certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality when it is linked to some inherent attributes of a particular production area. We discuss some welfare implications of introducing GI certification and show that an EU-style sui generis GI certification is preferable to the US-style approach based on certification marks. asymmetric information; certification; geographical indications; reputation; quality; trademarks.

Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation

We study firm reputation as a mechanism to assure product quality in perfectly competitive markets in a context in which both certification and trademarks are available. Shapiro’s (1983) model of reputation is extended to reflect both collective and firm-specific reputations, and this framework is used to study certification and trademarks for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). Our model yields two primary results. First, in markets with asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost of establishing reputation and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private trademarks are available. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. Second, the actual design of the certification scheme plays an important role in mitigating informational problems. From a policy perspective, our results have implications for the current debate and negotiations on GIs at the World Trade Organization and the ongoing product quality policy reform within the European Union. With regard to the instrument of choice to provide intellectual property protection for GIs, our model favors a sui generis scheme based on appellations over certification marks. Finally, our model supports the validity of the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme of the European Union as an instrument for the provision of high-quality products that are not linked to a geographic area.Asymmetric Information, Certification, Geographical Indications, Quality, Reputation, Environmental Economics and Policy, D23, D82, L14, L15, Q1,

Trace Hardy--Sobolev--Mazy'a inequalities for the half fractional Laplacian

In this work we establish trace Hardy-Sobolev-Maz'ya inequalities with best Hardy constants, for weakly mean convex domains. We accomplish this by obtaining a new weighted Hardy type estimate which is of independent inerest. We then produce Hardy-Sobolev-Maz'ya inequalities for the spectral half Laplacian. This covers a critical case left open in \cite{FMT1}

Improving L2L^2 estimates to Harnack inequalities

We consider operators of the form ${\mathcal L}=-L-V$, where $L$ is an elliptic operator and $V$ is a singular potential, defined on a smooth bounded domain $\Omega\subset \R^n$ with Dirichlet boundary conditions. We allow the boundary of $\Omega$ to be made of various pieces of different codimension. We assume that ${\mathcal L}$ has a generalized first eigenfunction of which we know two sided estimates. Under these assumptions we prove optimal Sobolev inequalities for the operator ${\mathcal L}$, we show that it generates an intrinsic ultracontractive semigroup and finally we derive a parabolic Harnack inequality up to the boundary as well as sharp heat kernel estimates

Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets

The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of the agricultural sector with free entry/exit. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality product is endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a competitive provision of quality that partly overcomes the market failure and leads to clear welfare gains, although they fall short of delivering the (constrained) first-best level of the high-quality good. The main beneficiaries of the welfare gains are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit if the production of high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own.geographical indications; quality certification; Welfare; competitive industry; free entry/exit; Marshallian stability; trademarks

Quality certification by geographical indications, trademarks and firm reputation

We develop a reputation model to study the concurrent use of trademarks and certification for food products with a geographical indication (GI). The model extends Shapiro\u27s (1983) approach to modelling reputation to a situation in which two technologies for the production of quality are available, one of which is available only in the GI region. In this setting, trademarks capture firm-specific reputations, whereas GI certification captures a notion of collective reputation. The model shows that GI certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality linked to some inherent attributes of a particular production area

Strength of Protection for Geographical Indications: Promotion Incentives and Welfare Effects

We address the question of how the strength of protection for geographical indications (GIs) affects the GI industry\u27s promotion incentives, equilibrium market outcomes, and the distribution of welfare. Geographical indication producers engage in informative advertising by associating their true quality premium (relative to a substitute product) with a specific label emphasizing the GI\u27s geographic origin. The extent to which the names/words of the GI label can be used and/or imitated by competing products—which depends on the strength of GI protection—determines how informative the GI promotion messages can be. Consumers’ heterogeneous preferences (vis-à-vis the GI quality premium) are modeled in a vertically differentiated framework. Both the GI industry and the substitute product industry are assumed to be competitive (with free entry). The model is calibrated and solved for alternative parameter values. Results show that producers of the GI and of the lower-quality substitute good have divergent interests: GI producers are better off with full protection, whereas the substitute good\u27s producers prefer intermediate levels of protection (but they never prefer zero protection because they benefit indirectly if the GI producers’ incentives to promote are preserved). For consumers and aggregate welfare, the preferred level of protection depends on the model\u27s parameters, with an intermediate level of protection being optimal in many circumstances

Sharp two-sided heat kernel estimates for critical Schr\"odinger operators on bounded domains

On a smooth bounded domain \Omega \subset R^N we consider the Schr\"odinger operators -\Delta -V, with V being either the critical borderline potential V(x)=(N-2)^2/4 |x|^{-2} or V(x)=(1/4) dist (x,\partial\Omega)^{-2}, under Dirichlet boundary conditions. In this work we obtain sharp two-sided estimates on the corresponding heat kernels. To this end we transform the Scr\"odinger operators into suitable degenerate operators, for which we prove a new parabolic Harnack inequality up to the boundary. To derive the Harnack inequality we have established a serier of new inequalities such as improved Hardy, logarithmic Hardy Sobolev, Hardy-Moser and weighted Poincar\'e. As a byproduct of our technique we are able to answer positively to a conjecture of E.B.Davies.Comment: 40 page